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National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with
International Norms: GATT/WTO and China's
Foreign Trade Reform
THOMAS YUNLONG MAN*
The world in which we are living is rapidly shrinking in terms of the
increasing interconnectedness and interdependence in economic life among
different national economies. In response to this fundamental change, more
and more nation-states have adopted internationally recognized and
institutionalized principles and practices in conducting their economic
activities. By no means is this trend limited solely to the developed, mostly
Western, countries. It also has spread to those newly industrializing countries
(NICs),' and more recently, to the developing world as well. In order to fully
participate in international economic exchanges, these developing and newly
developed countries find it necessary to play by the rules formulated by the
leading industrialized countries and manifested in the legal framework of
major international economic organizations. By adopting the normative
international practice to facilitate national legal restructuring, these countries
have strengthened the tendency toward the globalization of law, which, among
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., 1981, Shandong
Normal University, China; M.A., 1984, Beijing University, China; Ph.D., 1994, The Johns Hopkins
University.
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1. Although different opinions on the definition and classification of the NICs exist, generally
speaking, a complete list of the world's NICs would include the following countries and regions: South
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in East and South East Asia, India in
Southern Asia, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina in Latin America, and Spain, Portugal, and Greece in Southern
Europe. See PETER DIcKEN, GLoBAL SHFr: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AcnvTy 26 (2d
ed. 1992).
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other traits, is characterized by the phenomenon that international norms and
practices-forces outside the control of national legislative decisionmakers-
have informed and defined the lawmaking process of nation-states.
In this connection, this paper explores the dynamic interplay between
national legal construction and normative international practice by using China
as a case study. Specifically, it examines China's on-going efforts to reform
its foreign trade laws in order to obtain admission to the established
international trade community embodied in the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Part I will set forth the context-international as well as domestic-
within which China's application to GATT/WTO has taken place. Part II will
identify the major obstacles to China's admission to GATT/WTO in terms of
the incompatibility between the pre-reform Chinese foreign trade legal regime
and the GATT/WTO framework. Part Ill will examine China's reform efforts
in its foreign trade legal regime since its application to the GATT in 1986 and
assess the influence of the GATT/WTO principles and practices on the
emerging new Chinese foreign trade legal framework. Part IV will view
China's experience in a larger context of the globalization of law and reflect
on the relationship between national legal restructuring and international
norms. Part V will conclude this study by offering some preliminary thoughts
on the role of the nation-state in the process of globalization.
I. MISSION UNACCOMPLISHED: CHINA'S APPLICATION TO JOIN GATT/WTO
One fundamental objective of China's economic reform and openness
policy pursued in the past fifteen years has been full participation in the
international economic community by joining major international
organizations of finance and trade. After more than thirty years of isolation
and self-sufficiency, China's admission to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank in 1980 signified the beginning of China's return
to the world economic community.' Since then, China has joined many
2. There is no universally accepted definition of the concept "globalization" of law. For some recent
efforts to delineate important aspects of this concept, especially its connection with and distinctions from
"internationalization," see id. at 1-5 and the articles included in the inaugural issue of the INDIANA JOURNAL
OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, which grew out of a symposium entitled "The Globalization of Law, Politics,
and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform." I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (1993).
3. -HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHAEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD
BANK, AND GATr 57-81 (1990).
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international and regional economic organizations.' One conspicuous
exception, however, is China's hitherto unsuccessful effort to gain admission
to the GATT and its newly-born successor, the WTO.
As one of the three international institutions5 formed in the aftermath of
the Second World War constituting the postwar world economic order, the
GATT was an international treaty with its central mission promoting free trade
among the contracting parties. During the forty-seven years of its existence
(1947-1994), the GATT provided a legal framework within which most
international trade was conducted.' On January 1, 1995, the WTO was
established in accordance with the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations under the auspices of the GATT.7 The replacement
of the GATT by an institutional body, the WTO, ushered in a new era in the
international trade system.
Because China was among the original twenty-three signatories to the
GATT in 1947, it is a founding member of the GATT. After the establishment
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, the Nationalist
government withdrew to Taiwan but continued to occupy the "China seat" in
most international organizations, including the GATT and the United Nations.
In March 1950, the Nationalist regime in Taiwan unilaterally withdrew from
the GAT. 8 The PRC government has obtained membership in most
4. For a list of international organizations in which China had participated prior to 1987, see
Memorandum on China's Foreign Trade System, submitted to the Working Party of GATT in February
1987, in HUANG LIMING ET AL., ZHONGGUO RUGUANG ZHINAN (AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINA'S ACCESSION
TO GATT) 201-204 (1993). See also Wang Guiguo, China's Participation in International Organizations,
in CHINA FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY (Rui Mu & Wang Guiguo eds.,1990).
5. The IMF, founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, was designed to deal with the
cooperation and regulation of the monetary aspects of international economic exchanges. The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), also founded at the Bretton Woods Conference,
was originally devised to provide funds for the rebuilding of Western Europe and has since evolved into the
primary world economic organization under the auspices of the United Nations. See RICHARD N. GARDNER,
STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE (1980); EDWARD S. MASON AND ROBERT E.
ASHElE, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS (1973).
6. For the development of the GATT and its role in the postwar world, see ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993);
JOHN .H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1989); and GILBERT WNHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (1992).
7. WTO, FOCUS, No. I, Jan.-Feb., 1995, at 1. For analyses of the institutional transition from the
GATT to the WTO, see Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L., 349 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International
Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J., 829 (1995); and Albert Tita,
A Challenge for the World Trade Organization: Towards a True Transnational Law, JOURNAL OF WORLD
TRADE, June 1995, at 83.
8. Communication from Secretary-General of United Nations Regarding China, GAT
1997]
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international organizations as the sole representative of China since its return
to the United Nations in 1971. It argues that the withdrawal by the Taiwanese
authorities from the GATT was null and void because the Nationalist regime
in Taiwan ceased to be the legitimate government of China in 1949 and the
PRC government has never consented to the withdrawal. Therefore, China has
continued to be a contracting party9 and merely needs to "resume" its original
position in the GATT rather than apply for a new membership.'"
In 1982 China was granted observer status in the GATT. Four years later,
in July 1986, China officially notified the GATT Director-General of its
intention to resume its membership in the treaty. Since then China has made
continuous efforts to obtain approval of its application from the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. Although China, as a non-contracting party, participated fully in the
Uruguay Round negotiations and signed the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Final Act) and the
Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO
Agreement) in Morocco on April 16, 1994," it failed to gain admission to the
GATT during the Uruguay Round as it had expected. China's subsequent
efforts to rejoin GATT during the remainder of 1994, and thus to become a
founding member of the WTO, also proved ineffective. When the WTO came
into existence on January 1, 1995, China was not included in its membership. 2
Although the WTO granted China observer status on July 11, 1995,"3 the
eleventh largest trading nation in today's world 4 is still excluded from the
principal international trade organization.
Doc.GATTCPI54 Add. I (March 8, 1950).
9. Following the usage of terms in GATT documents, this paper uses "CONTRACTING PARTEs" (with
capitalization) to signify the signatories to the GAIT acting jointly as a body and "contracting party(ies)"
(without capitalization) to designate signatory(ies) acting in its(their) own capacity.
10. See Li Chungchou, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD TRADE 4(1987).
11. When the Uruguay Round was formally launched at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986,
the Ministers of CONTRACTING PARTIES gave special permission to allow China to take part in the
negotiations by adopting a provision in the Ministerial Declaration which states that the "[n]egotiations will
be open to... countries that have already informed the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at a regular meeting of the
Council of Representatives, of their intention to negotiate the terms of their membership as a contracting
party." Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round Declaration of 20 September 1986, Part 1, para.
F(aXiv), GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 33rd Supp. 1985-86, at 27.
12. For a list of WTO Members (1 January 1995), see WTO, supra note 7, at 5.
13. WTO, Focus, No. 4, July 1995, at 1-2.
14. In 1994, China ranked eleventh both as exporter and importer in world merchandise trade. See
WTO, Focus, No. 2, March-April 1995, at 8.
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As a major event in the restructuring of the post-Cold War international
trade framework," China's application to join GATT/WTO presents a number
of difficult problems in international law, world politics, and the global
economic order. It has generated a great deal of not only multilateral and
bilateral negotiations between concerned nations but also scholarly attention
around the world. 6
This paper does not intend to take part in the current debate on the
question of China's accession from the perspective of international law or
world politics nor does it purport to evaluate the merits and deficiencies of
China's application. Rather, it intends to examine the impact of the
GATT/WTO system on China's legal reform in general, and its foreign trade
legal regime in particular. By so doing, it seeks to demonstrate the dynamics
of interaction between international norms and national legal restructuring in
the context of the globalization of law in the post-Cold War era.
II. MAJOR OBSTACLES TO CHINA'S ADMISSION TO GATT/WTO
When China began to seek resumption of its GATT membership, it had
just started to transform its largely nonmarket economy into a market-oriented
economy. Between 1949 and 1978, China maintained a Soviet-style command
economic system characterized by State ownership, central planning, and total
government control over every aspect of the production and distribution of
goods and services. As an integral part of this command economy, foreign
15. For a general analysis of this process, see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM
(1990).
16. The following articles, selected from a vast literature, deal with important aspects of China's
application to GATT/WTO: Wengou Cai, China's GA7T Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues,
J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1992, at 35; Susanna Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GATT. A New Urgency with
the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (1994); Donald C. Clarke, GA TT
Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 517 (1994); James U. Feinerman, Chinese
Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?, THE CHINA QUARTERLY,
Mar. 1995, at 186; Forum: China's Entry into the International Economic System, 82 AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L.
PROC. 172 (1988); Yongjiang Gu, A Review and Preview of Negotiations China's Return to GA7T, in
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: CHINA'S RETURN TO GATT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE HONG KONG
ECONOMY (1993); Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining
China's Desire for Membership in the GA7T, 12 UCLA PUB. L. J. 431 (1994); Patrick H. Hu, The China
301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATT Membership, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 131 (1994); John
Linarelli, China and the GA7T Agreement on Government Procurement, 8 J. CHINESE L. 185 (1994);
Roundtable Discussion: GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former
Soviet Republics, 1992 COLOM. BUS. L. REv. 19 (1992); Guiguo Wang, China's Return to GA77, J. WORLD
TRADE, June 1994, at 51.
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trade was placed under direct control of the central government which pursued
an "inward-oriented strategy." Its purpose was designed not to gain profits
from the exchanges of goods, but strictly limited to realize the ultimate goal
of import substitution. 7 The economic reform, which was officially set into
motion in 1978, injected fundamental changes to this command economic
system. To implement its policy of reform and openness to the outside world,
China realized the importance of absorbing foreign capital and advanced
technology and the need to participate fully in international trade. Spurred by
this new desire to develop an outward looking economy, China became very
eager to join various major multinational organizations that serve as forums for
international cooperation and economic development. By rejoining GATT,
China expects to acquire the benefits conferred upon each contracting nation,
benefits it deems essential to the promotion of its rapidly growing foreign
trade. These prospective benefits include the entitlement to Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status, the right to participate in future multinational trade
negotiations, and possibly the entitlement to the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) status. 8
However, the GATT and WTO contracting parties, especially the United
States and other developed countries, maintain that although China has made
substantial progress in transforming its previously command economic system
into an increasingly market-oriented economy, considerable obstacles to
China's accession to GATT/WTO remain. The fundamental difficulty lies in
the fact that China has inherited from the pre-reform era a nonmarket foreign
trade legal regime which in most respects is incompatible with the market-
based principles of GATT.
First, the foundation of all GATT agreements between contracting nations-
-multilateral or bilateral-is the principle of nondiscrimination. Although no
clause in the GATT text specifies this principle, nondiscrimination is
embodied in the principles of reciprocity, MFN, and national treatment. 9 It
ensures that all benefits conferred upon any contracting party through
multinational or bilateral negotiations should be automatically available to
17. See NICHoLAs R. LARDY, FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, 1978-1990 at 16-
36(1992).
18. GSP provides developing countries with superior non-reciprocal tariff benefits for certain exports
extended by developed countries. For an elaboration of the possible benefits accorded by the admission to
GATI by Chinese commentators, see LIMING ET AL., supra note 4, at 64-66.
19. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARiFFS AND TRADE 1947, THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT, Articles I and I1, at 2-3, 6-7 (1990) [hereinafter GATT].
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other contracting parties. By contrast, the pre-reform foreign trade regime of
China was highly discriminatory. Because the State monopolized all trade
activities, the central government directed foreign trade not for the purpose of
exchanging goods but for the government procurement of necessary
merchandise and foreign currency. It used foreign trade planning to arbitrarily
set up trade policies and regulations that totally disregarded the principle of
equal treatment. By manipulating the rate of tariff, currency exchange rate,
and import/export quotas and licenses, the State was able not only to treat
foreign trading entities differently from domestic enterprises, but also to render
distinctive treatment to different industries according to its policy needs."0
Secondly, based on the principle of nondiscrimination, the GATT
framework is built upon the premise that trade levels can be increased, and
trade wars avoided, through multilateral tariff reductions. In market
economies, tariff cuts are presumed to have a direct effect on prices and
thereby have an influence on the decisions of consumers and the incentive
structure of industry. In a nonmarket economy, however, the effect of tariff
cuts are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gauge. If China retains its
pre-reform nonmarket economic system, any reduction in tariffs would only
have a marginal effect on its economic mechanism. In addition, China's tariffs
were very high, averaging 44 percent in the mid-1980s,2" as opposed to an
average of less than 10 percent imposed by major Western contracting parties
to GATT"
Thirdly, the pervasive use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, which is
a distinctive character of all foreign trade regimes subject to tight government
control and planning, comes into direct conflict with the GATT principle of
free trade and fair competition based on each nation's comparative advantage.
Prior to the mid-i 980s, the Chinese government employed numerous NTBs to
maintain absolute control over foreign trade. Those devices included, but by
no means were limited to, government subsidies, import/export quotas and
licenses, exchange rate control, and various forms of administrative
regulations. To join GATT/WTO, China must substantially reduce and
eventually eliminate those NTBs.
20. LARDY, supra note 4, at 16-19.
21. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 3, at 90.
22. As a result of the Tokyo Round of Multinational Negotiations which concluded in 1979, average
tariff rates on dutiable manufactured imports were set at 5.6% in the U.S., 7.2% in the EC, 4.9%6 in Japan,
and 8.9% in Canada. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 36-38.
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Finally, transparency is another fundamental principle of GATT. It
requires that all government regulations and dispute resolution procedures on
foreign trade be openly available to all concerned parties, whether domestic or
foreign.' In sharp contrast, the pre-reform Chinese government executed its
trade policy by strictly following the State foreign plan and "internal
documents," which were treated as "State secrets." Virtually no laws and
regulations were published or easily available to foreign companies. Lack of
transparency became a distinctive feature of China's foreign trade regime and
thus a central concern for the contracting parties of GATT.'
China was not unaware of these inconsistencies between its foreign trade
legal regime and the GATT framework. Scholars and government officials
alike openly acknowledged these inconsistencies.' They also maintain that
recognizing these inconsistencies does not mean that China should stay outside
GATT/WTO. Instead, the Chinese government, especially those reform-
minded members of the Communist Party leadership, hopes to use the
opportunity of accession as an impetus to accelerate the restructuring of
China's foreign trade legal regime. For them, the GATT framework provides
a ready reference and established model of international practice that can be
emulated.' This emulation has resulted in remarkable progress in
transforming China's foreign trade legal regime.
II. RESTRUCTURING CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE LEGAL REGIME, 1986-1995
A few months after the submission of its application to resume its GATT
membership in October 1986, China presented a memorandum on its foreign
trade regime to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of GATT.' On March 4, 1987, the
23. GAIT, supra note 19, Article X, at 16-17.
24. See James McGregor, Chinese Talks on GA TT Stall over Basic Issues, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar.
3, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL-WSJA 2033496.
25. See LmaiNGETAL., supra note 4, at 81-82.
26. For instance, one recent report in the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party wrote,
"since the [beginning] of the reform and openness policy in 1978, China has always treated the conformation
with international practice as one of the important goals of its legal restructuring." According to the same
report, a high official on the Working Committee on Law of the National People's Congress Standing
Committee, which is in charge of initiating and drafting laws and legislation, said that: "reform and
openness [to the outside world] requires common language [in international exchange]. While the
conformity with international practice in economic matters comes along, it naturally demands conformity
in legal system .... It has become a common practice," he added, "to use broadly the successful law-
making experience from abroad in formulating laws of China." RENMIN RiBAO [THE PEOPLE'S DAILY]
(Overseas Edition), Dec. 13, 1995, at 4.
27. China's Status as a Contracting Party, GATT Doc. No. L/6125, (Feb. 18, 1987). The Chinese
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GATT Secretariat appointed a Working Party to consider China's accession.
Since then, substantial negotiations between China and some GATT
contracting parties, such as the United States, the European Economic
Community, and Japan, have taken place under the auspices of the Working
Party except during a short period of interruption after the Tiananmen event
in June 1989. The process of negotiation has been extremely complicated. 8
On the one hand, the GATT contracting parties (and the WTO Member States
since January 1995), especially the Western countries, realize that it is
necessary and beneficial to the world economic order to include China in the
GATT/WTO framework in light of China's present and potential economic
importance.29 On the other hand, they claim that China's accession must be
approached from a pure business basis that, in their perception, will ensure the
integrity of GATT/WTO system and protect the economic interests of their
respective countries.
As of the end of 1996, it seemed this lengthy and cumbersome negotiation
had yet to yield any definite result as to China's accession to WTO. But it is
a misperception to suggest that the ten years of negotiations have been wasted.
On the contrary, this process has exerted profound impact on China's on-going
foreign trade legal reform. In response to the questions and suggestions posed
by the Working Party and other contracting parties, China has introduced a
series of reforms which have fundamentally transformed its foreign trade
system from a closed nonmarket model to a considerably open and
increasingly market-driven system.
At the heart of this transformation is the official recognition that the
ultimate goal of China's economic reform is to establish a "socialist market
economy" (emphasis added). This recognition was declared to the world in
March 1993 in Article 7 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China.3" Before this amendment, China had always
version can be found in LIMING ET AL., supra note 4, at 195-230.
28. For instance, by mid-1988 alone, China was asked more than 1,200 questions, a record number
in GATT history. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 3, at 96.
29. On many occasions, several Western representatives to GATT in Geneva have said, "[i]t is
impossible to envisage the international trade system of the early twenty-first century without China being
part of it." Id. at 88. In May 1994, Mr. Peter Sutherland, then GATT Director-General, remarked: "I do not
think that any GATT member doubts the importance of China becoming a full and active participant in the
multilateral system-the GAlT as it is now, and in the future, the WTO." WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
GATT ATvrrEs; 1994-1995 at 113 (1996).
30. The original version of Article 15 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China states:
The State implements planned economy on the basis of socialist public ownership.
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insisted on the official line of establishing a "socialist planned economy with
Chinese characters," which was interpreted and applied in such a way that
various reform measures and experiments that contain market elements were
permitted in practice, but precluded in theory the possibility of developing a
market economy. In accordance with this insistence on a "planned economy,"
the pre-amendment Constitution stipulated that the State shall use "the
comprehensive balance of the economic plan" to manage the economy. The
1993 amendment eliminates the State's power in making and implementing
"the economic plan," and changes the role of the State from micro-control to
macro-management through the making and enforcement of laws and
regulations. Notwithstanding the preservation of the conditioning term
"socialist" in the terminology of the 1993 amendment, the recognition that a
"market economy" is the ultimate solution for China represents a decisive
theoretical shift in China's economic reform rationale. This shift entails
profound ramifications for China's relationship with such international
organizations as GATT/WTO.3
In accordance with this subtle yet crucial shift of reform policy toward
market economy, China also adopted concrete measures to change major areas
of its foreign trade system, effectively transforming the landscape of its foreign
trade legal regime.
The State uses the comprehensive balance of the economic plan and the
supplementary effect of market conditioning to guarantee the harmonized
development of the national economy in appropriate proportions.
This article was amended by Article 7 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China enacted on March 29, 1993:
The State implements socialist market economy.
The State shall strengthen economic law making and refine macro-management and
control.
The State prohibits in accordance with law any organization or individual from
disturbing social economic order.
THE WORKING COMMrTEE ON LAW OF THE STANDING COMmrITEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
ET AL. EDS., THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ANNOTATED (Beijing: Law Publishing House,
1994) [hereinafter PRC LAWS ANNOTATED], at 5, 54. See also China Approves Changes in Constitution,
Government to Reflect Market Economy Shift, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 594 (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter
China Approves Changes].
31. China Approves Changes, supra note 30.
[Vol. 4:471
1997] GATT/WTO AND CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 481
A. Toward Free Trade: Reducing Tariffs and Phasing Out Non-Tariff
Barriers
Before the mid-1980s, tariffs played only a marginal, if not entirely
negligible, role in China's foreign trade regime. Under the highly centralized
foreign trade system based on central planning and controlled by
administrative directives, tariffs were simply regarded as one of several
sources of government revenues. For over thirty years, they were collected by
the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) based on tariff rates that were almost
never adjusted. By virtue of the heavy use of government subsidies for
imports and exports in accordance with the arbitrary national plan, tariff rates
were totally divorced from the actual value of the goods in the world market.
Under the national plan, government subsidies for imports and exports were
pervasive. Tariff rates did not reflect the actual value of the goods in the world
market because prices paid by domestic end users of imported goods were not
tied to the international price adjusted for tariffs but to the price of domestic
substitute goods." Therefore, just as in other centrally planned economies, the
role of tariffs was redundant and had virtually no impact on either the volume
of trade or the import and export decisions. Based on the policy of self-
sufficiency and protection of national industries, the tariff rates were
prohibitively high, which in effect stifled the growth of China's foreign trade.
Between 1956 and 1977, China's foreign trade amounted to less than 4 percent
of national product, a trade-national-product ratio well below those of not only
developed countries but also other large developing countries such as Brazil
and India."
Under this central planning system, various related ministries and
administrative commissions directly under the central government managed
China's foreign trade. These ministries and commissions combined business
and administrative functions. They had full discretion to translate any
administrative objectives directly into business decisions. Therefore, there was
practically no need to enact laws and regulations to legalize the foreign trade
management."
32. LARDY, supra note 17, at 47.
33. In 1970, the trade-national-product ratio for Brazil and India were 13.6 percent and 8.7 percent
respectively. IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, August 1975. See JOHN C. Hsu, CHINA'S
FOREIGN TRADE REFORM: IMPACT ON GROWTH AND STABILITY 1 (1989).
34. ZHONGGUO DuIwAI JINGJI MAOYI ZHINAN [AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC
AND TRADE PoLICIES] 35-36, 97-99 (Liu Xiangdong et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter CHINA'S FOREIGN
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One of the central promises of China's economic reform was to reduce the
role of the centralized economic plan and to introduce market mechanisms into
the Chinese economy. As part of this undertaking, the scope of foreign trade
planning was diminished in an effort to decentralize the foreign trade
management." In the early 1980s, the State began to make more active use of
tariffs and taxes as trade policy instruments. Reflecting the heightened status
of tariffs in the foreign trade system, China streamlined the bureaucratic
structure of the foreign trade management in the central government. As early
as 1980, the former Customs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was
elevated to a ministerial level entity, the General Administration of Customs.
The new agency, directly under the State Council, became responsible for
formulation and administration of policies, laws, and regulations concerning
tariffs. In 1987, the Customs Tariff Rate Commission, an organ under the
Ministry of Finance, was abolished and replaced with a new Customs Tariff
Commission. Chaired by the Ministry of Finance, the Commission operated
as a highly-powered body directly under the State Council. The membership
consisted of the chief of the General Administration of Customs and a vice-
minister of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. 6
At the same time, China stepped up its effort to promulgate laws and tariff
schedules in order to make the foreign trade administration more transparent.
In 1987, The National People's Congress enacted a comprehensive customs
law to replace the interim law that had governed customs since 195 L" The
new Customs Law stipulated that all "customs schedules shall be published."38
In 1985 the various import and export tariffs that had been announced in the
previous five years were published in the first comprehensive tariff schedule
released since 1951. Since then, any changes in tariff rates have been
announced in the monthly publication of the General Customs Administration,
Zhongguo Haiguan (Chinese Customs) and in the IMF's annual reports."
China also tried to make its tariff system congruent with the standard
international practice by reducing tariffs and assuming more and more
obligations embodied in various international organizations and conventions.
POLICIES].
35. Id at 37.
36. LARDY, supra note 17, at 47.
37. PRC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 30, at 1330-1358.
38. Id. at 1332.
39. LARDY, supra note 17, at 47.
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In 1983, China joined the Customs Cooperation Council. 4 But its efforts to
reduce tariffs have not been as successful as its efforts to reform the foreign
trade management system. The concern of protecting its national industries,
especially those technology intensive industries such as automobile,
machinery, and electronics, from being destroyed by the sudden influx of
imported goods underscored the cautious course taken by China to reduce the
general level of its tariff rates. By 1987, the weighted average tariff rate was
reduced to 39 percent. Five years later, however, the unweighted average tariff
rate was increased to 42.8 percent. When weighted by the value of trade in
each category (at world price), the average tariff rate was 31.9 percent.
Compared with other large developing countries, this rate was compatible with
those of Brazil (31.9 percent) and Pakistan (35.9 percent), higher than those
of Argentina (17.1 percent) and Colombia (15.1 percent), but much lower than
that of India (54.8 percent)."' It was not until the end of 1995 that China
decided to reduce its general tariff rate to 23 percent, effective April 1, 1996.42
This drastic reduction makes China's average tariff rate one of the lowest
among major developing countries.
While the role of tariffs became more and more important in China's
foreign trade regime, the significance of various NTBs gradually diminished.
When China began to reform its foreign trade regime, a wide range of NTBs
had been developed. These NTBs comprised a variety of administrative
instruments including the mandatory import plan, canalization of imports
through designated National Foreign Trade Corporations (NFTCs), import
licensing, quotas, and import controls. By one estimation, in 1992 all non-
overlapping NTBs (not including mechanisms to control access to foreign
exchange) taken together applied to 17.5 percent of the total number of lines
of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, and during the first quarter of that year,
they accounted for 51.4 percent of total imports.43 This practice is clearly not
in conformity with the GATT principle against NTBs.4
At the heart of those NTBs designed for the purpose of controlling imports
was the mandatory import plan and canalization of imports. Goods subject to
40. Yvonne Chan, Understanding the Tariff System, THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Nov.-Dec. 1987,
at 46,48.
41. WORLD BANK, CHINA: FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 1994 at 56 (1994).
42. Gaingehetiaozheng Jinkou Shuishou Zhengee [Reforming and Adjusting Import Tax Policy],
RENMIN RIBAO [THE PEOPLE'S DAILY], Dec. 29, 1995, at I.
43. WORLD BANK, supra note 41, at 62.
44. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATr SYSTEM, supra note 15, art. XI.
483
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
import planning were regarded as essential either for the people's livelihood
or for national economic development. They were subject to State pricing at
levels substantially out of line with world prices, thus requiring an import
subsidy. Although the importance of the import plan had been declining over
time, by 1992 it still applied to eleven broad product groups including
commodities such as grain, fertilizers, iron ore, cotton, wood, plastic sheeting
and wood pulp. Together these commodities consituted 9.1 percent of all
Harmonized Customs Tariff Schedule lines and 18.5 percent of total imports."
The imports of all commodities under the import plan were also canalized.
They were limited to designated NFTCs for the purpose of facilitating the
administration of subsidies needed to control the price of mandatory plan
commodities." In 1992, 32 percent of total imports were estimated to be
subject to control through canalization. Of these, about two-thirds were
imports under the mandatory plan."7
With the gradual dismantling of the mandatory foreign trade plan and the
decentralization of foreign trade management, the central government
relinquished, step by step, its monopoly over foreign trade through a few
centrally controlled NFTCs and gave provinces and certain larger enterprises
the right to handle foreign trade for their respective regions or industries.48 By
1991, the government subsidies to exports were abolished and each NFTC
became responsible for the economic benefits of its own operation. "9
Import and export licensing is another NTB widely used by China to
control its foreign trade. It is interesting to note that China restored the use of
licensing in foreign trade in the early 1980s as a measure to reduce the scope
of the mandatory import and export plan. When the People's Republic of
China was founded in 1949, it adopted the policy of using licensing to control
all imports and exports. But this policy was abandoned in the mid-1950s when
the centralized foreign trade system based upon the mandatory national plan
was firmly established.' After the economic reform began, the licensing
system was reinstituted as a means to displace the function of the mandatory
plan as well as to serve the purpose of balance of payments and protecting
45. WORLD BANK, supra note 41, at 63.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 64.
48. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 34, at 37; LARDY, supra note 17, at 39.
49. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 34, at 38.
50. Id. at 97-99.
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domestic industries."' As of 1992, 53 goods were subject to import licensing. 2
Since then, China has reduced the number of goods subject to import licensing
on several occasions.13 As a result, the effective application of licensing in
China has been limited to a scope essentially compatible with most countries
who have GATT/WTO membership. 4
As for the use of another NTB, import and export quotas, China's practice
has never been too much out of step with that of the Western free trade
nations." In fact, the import and export quota system, especially those for
exported goods, was originally adopted to ensure effective utilization of quotas
imposed on China's textile exports by the Western countries, (mainly the
United States and the European Economic Community). Consequently it was
basically passive in nature. 6 Only a few import quotas are actively imposed
for the purposes of protecting China's machinery and electronic industries and
maintaining the balance of payments. In 1992, import quotas applied to only
7.7 percent of total imports, and export quotas covered 15 percent of total
exports." Apparently, the current quota system has not been used to impede
51. Guojia Jinchukou Guanliweiynanhui He Duiwai Maoyibu Chukouxukezheng Zhidu Zanying
Banfa [The Interim Measures for the Export Licensing System by the State Import and Export Control
Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade], ZHONGGUO SHEWAI JINoJI FALu HumIAN (1949-1985) [A
COLLECTION OF CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS], at 467-469 [hereinafter
COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS]; Zhonghuarenmin Gingheguo Jinkou Huowu Xukezheng Zhidu
Zhanying Tiaoli [The Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the Licensing System For
Imported Goods], id. at 477-480.
52. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 34, at 100, 183-186.
53. Wuoguo Gaige Jinkou Guanli Tizhi De Yuyi Jucuo [Another Step in Reforming the Import
Management System of China], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], May 27, 1994 at 1. Following the lifting
of import control on 283 goods at the end of 1993, China abolished import licensing and quotas for 195
goods in May 1994. Id. In January 1996, China again lifted import control on 176 goods. Shenhua Jikou
Tizhi Gaige [Deepening the Import System Reform], RENMiN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], January 3, 1996,
at2.
54. Despite the continuous efforts by GATT members to eliminate the use of quotas and licensing in
their respective foreign trade regimes, these efforts have yet to achieve the proclaimed goal of eradicating
licensing and quotas in the world trade system. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note
6, at 129.
55. For instance, quotas are widely used by the United States to afford protection to domestic
production of agricultural products, clothing and textiles, steel and certain electronic products. 19 C.F.R.
§ 132 (1993). By comparison, China's import licenses and controls are concentrated in three broad groups
of similar nature: (a) agricultural raw materials subject to price controls and import planning (rubber, cork
and timber, wood pulp and textile fibers such as wool and cotton); (b) critical manufacturing sectors such
as iron and steel products, textile yarns and machinery where domestic production is significant; and (c)
nonessential consumer items such as beverages and tobacco. WORLD BANK, supra note 4 1, at 66.
56. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 34, at 103-107.
57. WORLD BANK, supra note 41, at xx-xxi.
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the process of trade liberalization and thus should not be a formidable obstacle
to China's GATT/WTO membership.
B. Toward National Treatment: Tax Reform
Based on the general principle of nondiscrimination, GATT requires that
each contracting party grant other contracting parties not only equal tariff
treatment and MFN trading status, but also national treatment. 8 Recognizing
that internal taxation, if discriminatorily applied to foreign businesses or
imported goods, may work as disguised protection against imports, Article IR
of GATT specifically establishes the principle that internal taxes and
regulations "should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production." 9 Under this principle of national
treatment, internal taxes and other charges, laws, regulations, and other
requirements affecting business transactions must be applied on an equal basis
to domestic entities or domestically produced goods and foreign entities or
imported goods.
Before 1990, China had an extremely complex tax structure characterized
by unequal treatment not only among domestic enterprises, foreign companies,
and enterprises with foreign investment, but also among domestic enterprises
under different forms of ownership. Within domestic enterprises, the
government set up distinctive tax rates for enterprises according to the nature
of their ownership, i.e., State-owned, collectively owned, or privately owned.
In the pre-reform era, the State-owned enterprises had no tax liability; they
simply turned their profits over to the State. Beginning in the mid-1980s,
enterprise profit taxes were introduced with varying rates ranging from 55 to
68.5 percent. Collectively owned enterprises were taxed at progressive rates
up to 55 percent. They were not required to give part of their profits directly
to the govemment.6°
Unlike domestic enterprises, enterprises with foreign participation were
subject to entirely different tax treatment. These enterprises were grouped into
two categories, foreign enterprises and enterprises with foreign investment.
According to the legal definitions under Chinese law, "foreign enterprises"
58. GAiT, supra note 19, art. I1.
59. Id. at 7.
60. A.J. Easson & Li Jinyan, The Evolution of the Tax System in the People's Republic of China, 53
STAN. J. INT'L L. 399, 421 (1987).
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meant the foreign companies, enterprises, or other economic organizations that
either have business places within or have no business places within China but
derive income from China. "Enterprises with foreign investment" meant those
companies established in China with foreign investment.6' The major
difference in legal status is that foreign enterprises are not Chinese legal
persons while enterprises with foreign investment are Chinese legal persons
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese law. Depending on the
mode and proportion of foreign investment, the latter were further divided into
three types: Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures (EV), Chinese-foreign
contractual joint ventures (CJV), and wholly foreign-owned enterprises
(WFOE). 2
Under this dual tax system, where one applies to domestic enterprises and
the other applies to enterprises with foreign interests, the tax rates for the two
enterprises were by no means compatible. To be sure, this practice did not
discriminate against foreign enterprises or enterprises with foreign investment.
Instead, the Chinese government granted preferential tax treatment to
enterprises with foreign participation in an effort to attract foreign investment.
Therefore, while enterprises with foreign investment and foreign enterprises
pay a 33 percent income tax (30 percent national income tax plus 3 percent
local income tax),63 both State-owned enterprises and collectively owned
domestic enterprises were required to pay enterprise income tax at a
progressive rate up to 55 percent.
Despite the fact that hardly any discrimination against enterprises with
foreign participation existed, this dual tax system created numerous problems
for foreign investors because of its complexity. First, besides enterprise
income tax, enterprises with foreign investment were also required to pay the
consolidated industrial and commercial tax. Initially introduced in 1958, the
consolidated industrial and commercial tax was an extremely complicated tax
system with forty-two rates for different enterprises, products, and
transactions. This tax subjected enterprises with foreign participation to
different rates of tax responsibility according to type of industry, products and
61. QUANGUO RENDA CHANGWEIHUI FAZHI GONGZUO WEIYUANHUI [WORKING COMMI'rEE ON LAW
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. COMP.1, ZUIXIN CHANGYONG JINHJI
FALUFAGUI SHOUCE [HANDBOOK OF MOST RECENT ECONOMIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS] 349 (1994)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS].
62. Id.
63. Id. at 350.
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transactions.' Second, even within a Chinese-foreign contractual joint
venture, while the Chinese party to the joint venture was required to pay taxes
in accordance with laws and regulations for domestic enterprise, the foreign
party had to pay taxes in accordance with another set of laws and regulations
specifically made for foreign enterprises.6" Understandably, this complicated
dual system created unnecessary confusion among foreign investors who were
usually unfamiliar with the Chinese legal regime.
More importantly, this dual system contradicted the GATT principle of
national treatment. To bring it closer to the established international norms,
China began to draft a new tax code in 1990 and enacted the Income Tax Law
of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise with Foreign Investment and
Foreign Enterprises (EFIFEITL) in April 1991, which took effect on July 1 of
the same year.' EFIFEITL imposes a uniform tax rate for three kinds of
enterprises with foreign investment, although foreign enterprises are taxed at
different rates depending on the nature of the income.67 Under this legislation,
all three types of enterprises with foreign investment are subject to a flat tax:
profits are taxed 30 percent. In addition, a local income tax at the rate of 3
percent is levied on the taxable income. Taken together, the flat tax and the
local income tax equal a tax rate of 33 percent"-a much lower rate than the
usual 40 to 50 percent rate imposed by other countries on foreign
corporations.69
By the end of 1993, similar measures were taken to unify the tax legal
framework relating to domestic companies with the promulgation of a series
of tax laws and regulations." A uniform enterprise tax applicable to all
64. COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 51, at 700-711. See also YAO MEIZHEN,
ET AL., WAISHANG Touzi QIYEFA JLAOCHENG [A COURSE ON ENTERPRISES wriT FOREIGN INVESTMENT] 161
(1989).
65. MEIZHEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 157.
66. HANDBOOKOFLAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 349-353.
67. Guiguo Wang, China's Return to GATT- Legal and Economic Implications, J. WORLD TRADE,
June 1994, at 51, 57-58, 58 n.35.
68. Hu Zhixin, China's Tax Law Applicable to Enterprises with Foreign Participation, in CHINA
FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 2.
69. Id. at 3 n.1.
70. HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 60, at 399-445. These laws and regulations
include the following: (1) The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Tax Collection Control (Sept.
1992); (2) The Implementing Rules for the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Tax Collection
Control (Aug. 1993); (3) The Interim Regulations on Value-Added Tax (Nov. 1993); (4) The Interim
Regulations on Consumption Tax (Dec. 1993); (5) The Interim Regulations on Business Tax (Nov. 1993);
(6) The Interim Regulations on Enterprises Income Tax (Nov. 1993); (7) The Interim Regulations on Land
Appreciation Tax (Nov. 1993); and (8) The Interim Regulations on Natural Resources Tax (Nov. 1993).
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domestic enterprises regardless of their ownership was established. It is not
a coincidence that the tax rate was set at 33 percent." As a result, the tax rate
applicable to State-owned companies, collectively owned enterprises, and
privately owned enterprises, as well as other domestic entities, was brought in
line with the rate for enterprises with foreign investment. In the same period,
China also reformed its turnover tax system by abolishing the industrial and
commercial tax applicable to foreign enterprises and enterprises with foreign
investment, and applying value-added tax, consumption tax, and business tax,
which had previously been established for domestic enterprises, equally to
enterprises with foreign participation.'
Whereas various preferential tax treatments are retained for enterprises
with foreign participation, these new laws and regulations have placed
different types of domestic enterprises, foreign enterprises, and enterprises
with foreign investment on the same footing with respect to taxation. The
unification of the tax system, an important step toward establishing a market
economy, has brought China's tax law regime into compliance with GATT's
national treatment requirement.
C. Toward Marketization: The Foreign Exchange Reform
As indicated by the concluding remarks of the GATT Working Party on
China's application on March 22, 1993, China's dual-rate currency mechanism
emerged as one of the key obstacles to China's bid, especially when the
Uruguay Round of Negotiations drew to its conclusion."
Before the economic reform started in 1979, control of Chinese foreign
exchange was wholly concentrated in the hands of the central government. In
accordance with a structure that employed planned directives for managing the
economy and a State monopoly of foreign trade, the central government used
administrative instrumentalities to manage foreign exchange.74 With the
coming of the economic reform, an increasing number of foreign enterprises
and businessmen came to China to make investment or conduct business
Id. The last six regulations all came into effect on January 1, 1994. For the text of these regulations, see id.
71. Id. at 429.
72. HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 397-398.
73. Tatks on China's GATT Membership End; Questions Raised on Currency Proposal, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 490 (Mar. 24, 1993).
74. Chen Quangeng, Foreign Exchange Control in China, in CHINA FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW:
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 4,4-5.
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operations. To meet the demand of this new development, it soon became
necessary to reform the foreign exchange system. Thus, when China's foreign
trade experienced rapid growth in the 1980s, the central government also
relaxed State control over foreign exchange by decentralizing the management
of foreign exchange. Following the same pattern of reform in the foreign trade
management area, the responsibilities for the administration of and the
business operation of foreign exchange were separated. Under the direction
of the People's Bank of China, which exercises the function of the central
bank, the State Administration of Exchange Control performs the
administration of foreign exchange, and the Bank of China, China's
specialized bank for foreign exchange, manages the business side of foreign
exchange.75
Beginning in the mid-1980s, China carefully constructed a dual-rate
currency mechanism, administering foreign exchange rates through a loose
network of exchange centers or swap centers. By 1989, about eighty swap
centers existed throughout China; they became the only channel through which
foreign enterprises, enterprises with foreign investment, foreign businessmen,
and foreign tourists could make currency conversion in China.76 The
enterprises with foreign investment relied on these centers to acquire
RENMINBI (RMEB, the Chinese currency) in order to pay local costs, and to
exchange their domestic earnings into hard currency for repatriation. All
enterprises, domestic as well as foreign, acquired their hard currency from
these centers to pay for imported goods. By 1993, the swap centers handled
about 80 percent of all current account transactions within China. '
Under this dual-rate system, the People's Bank of China administered two
exchange rates. First, it set an official rate for RMB, which was used by
tourists and for priority imports under the State plan. Second, the bank
allowed the swap center administrators to peg a daily swap center rate, which
was allowed to float within a limited range. This rate was allowed to
depreciate relative to the official rate, and thus accurately reflect supply and
demand."
Although it was first introduced as a reform measure to decentralize
China's foreign currency management, this dual-rate system soon became a
75. Id. at 18-19.
76. LARDY, supranote 17, at61.
77. China Unifies Exchange Rates, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at 11, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
78. LARDY, supra note 17, at 62.
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target of international criticism as being inconsistent with international practice
under the GATT. The United States' Department of Treasury first cited China
for "manipulating" its currency in November 1992, and continued to make this
claim throughout 1993. Within the GATT Working Party, the representatives
from the European Community and other developed countries echoed the U.S.
complaints. '
These criticisms focused on two aspects of the dual-rate exchange system.
Both cast the system as erecting a prohibitive NTB for China's foreign trade.
First, it was alleged that the dual-rate worked as a device of government
subsidy to a selected number of Chinese enterprises conducting imports.
While the GATT charter and the GATT rulings do not specifically outlaw
dual-rate currency regimes, they do limit a nation's ability to restrict imports
for the purpose of protecting its balance of payment.' By maintaining the
artificially imposed difference between the official exchange rate and the
floating swap center rate, it was alleged that the central government was able
to protect certain industries by allowing them to pay for imported commodities
at the overvalued official rate. The military and some selected State-owned
enterprises reaped benefit from this system by paying less than the actual price
to purchase imported goods at a currency loss to be absorbed by the central
bank.'
Secondly, the dual-rate system was described as a hidden tax on currency
trades. The central bank could target foreigners by forcing them to register
their earnings in China at the official rate, which was artificially kept at a much
lower ratio than the swap center rate, but repatriate profits at the swap center
rate. Tourists also had to use the official rate to buy local currency. Foreign
investors made their earnings in local currency and had little or no foreign
currency earnings to help pay for needed imports, and thus had no way to
acquire hard currency for repatriation."
Thus, during the last three years of continuous talks between China and the
GATT Working Party on China's application before the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, currency controls became a conspicuous point of contention. 3
79. Chris Brown, China's GA7T Bid: Why All the Fuss about Currency Controls?, 3 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 57, 63-64 (1994).
80. GAT , supra note 19, art. XVII.
81. Brown, supranote 79, at61.
82. Pamela Baldinger & Anne Stevenson-Yang, Trends and Issues: New Reforms and Taxes for '94,
CIUNA BUS. REv., Jan. 1994, at 4; James McGregor, China Removes Controls on Currency Exchanges,
ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 26, 1993, at 26, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
83. Talks on China's GATT Membership End, Questions Raised on Currency Proposal, 10 Int'l Trade
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In direct response to these criticisms, China's delegates promised in the
summer of 1993 that China would achieve a single exchange rate within five
years, and convertibility shortly thereafter 4
But the action turned out to be more swift than the promise. Reflecting the
sense of urgency that mounted as the Uruguay Round drew to a close, China
moved quickly at the end of 1993. Only days after the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round in December 1993, China made the surprising announcement
that it was abolishing the dual-rate exchange system and implementing a
unified foreign exchange rate, to come into effect on January 1, 1994.8' The
new unified exchange rate adopted the former swap center rate of RMB 8.7
yuan (Chinese dollar) per U.S. dollar, thus in effect eliminating the former
official rate of exchange. In the meantime, China abandoned the retention
system that allowed certain enterprises to keep up to 50 percent of their foreign
exchange earnings and established an interbank foreign exchange market, in
which domestic enterprises are allowed to acquire hard currency as long as
they have the proper import licenses." Several months later, China opened a
national foreign exchange center in Shanghai which, as the hub of China's
interbank market, is linked to trading centers in other major cities. 7
The unification of foreign exchange rates effectively eliminated the
government subsidy to selected industries in buying imported commodities."
Despite lingering concerns about the performance of the newly-erected
interbank exchange mechanism, China clearly made a major move toward
conforming its foreign exchange structure with international norms. But for
the sense of urgency to enter the GATT before the WTO was officially formed,
it is hard to imagine that China would have given up its dual-rate exchange
system in such a dramatic fashion and as early as 1994. In fact, the unification
of the foreign exchange rates came as a surprise to most observers and
commentators of the Chinese economy, 9 for in April 1993 China had just
Rep. (BNA) 490 (Mar. 24, 1993).
84. Brown, supra note 79, at 74.
85. China to Unify RMB Exchange Rate on January, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
December 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ALLWLD File.
86. China: Central Bank's Note on Foreign Exchange System, Bus. WK. (CHINA DAILY
SUPPLEMENT), Jan. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
87. National Foreign Exchange Trading Center Opens in Shanghai, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
88. Brown, supra note 79, at 95.
89. For instance, a commentator wrote in May 1993 that the promulgation of the Regulations on the
Foreign Exchange Swap Market indicates that "within a number of years China will not open up its foreign
currency free [exchange] market." Bi KExi, WmtHui, FENGXIAN, & BAOZHI [FOREIGN CURRENCY, RISK, AND
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institutionalized its dual-rate system by promulgating comprehensive
administrative regulations on the swap market.'
D. Toward Legalization: The Foreign Trade Law of 1994
Before 1994, no national legislation on foreign trade was ever made in
China which was applicable throughout the country. The Chinese government
relied solely on administrative regulations and directives to exert total control
over foreign trade. Most of these administrative regulations and directives
were never openly published and made known to the outside world. For one
and a half decades after the beginning of foreign trade reform in 1979, the
legal framework was based on half a dozen administrative regulations. 9' This
practice directly conflicted with international norms and GATT practices that
favor published laws over discrete administrative regulations. Before long, the
void of national legislation which created lack of unity and transparency in
China's foreign trade legal framework caused widespread concerns in China's
trading partners and became a major obstacle to China's accession to the
GATT. To dispel this concern, the Chinese government accelerated the pace
to enact a foreign trade law with the advent of the 1990s.
May 12, 1994 marked a watershed occasion in China's foreign trade law
reform. That day, the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's
Congress passed the first comprehensive foreign legislation in modem Chinese
history, the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China (FTL).'2
With the FTL coming into effect the following July 1, China's foreign trade
legal regime finally took shape, after more than fifteen years of continuous
reform and the promulgation of hundreds of laws and regulations governing
HEDGE] 49 (1993).
90. Waihui Tiaoji Shichang Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations on Foreign Currency Swap Market], FAGUi
HUtBAN(April 15, 1993) (P.R.C.).
91. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES., supra note 34, at 108, 1337. These administrative regulations
include the following: the Provisional Measures for the Management of Imports in Foreign Trade; the
Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Licensing System for Imported Goods; and
the Detailed Implementing Rules for the Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the
Licensing System for Imported Goods. Id.
92. HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 248-254.
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various aspects of foreign economic relations.93 More than anything else, the
FTL symbolizes the legalization of China's foreign trade legal regime.
The drafters of the FTL followed three proclaimed principles in drafting
this legislation. All of them bear clear indications of the molding influence of
GATT principles and practices:
First, China's foreign trade policies and regulations must
conform to the basic principles laid out in the FTL and must
be openly published and freely available. Second, bans or
restrictions on imports and exports must conform to GATT
rules and must be transparent. Third, domestic industries
must be protected through legal proceedings against unfair
imports and not by administrative measures.'
For the first time in China's foreign trade legal history, the FTL
established comprehensive and legally defined principles for China's foreign
trade policies and practice. At the outset, it underscores the fundamental
principle established in the 1993 amendment to the Constitution95 and declares
that the promotion of a "socialist market economy" is the ultimate goal for
China's foreign trade.' Next, it defines the term "foreign trade" as including
"import and export of goods, import and export of technology, and
international service trade." Confirming China's readiness to assume all
obligations under such international treaties and organizations as GATT and
WTO, Article 6 states:
With respect to foreign trade, the People's Republic of China
shall, in accordance with international treaties or agreements
which it has concluded or is a participant in, or based on the
93. Liu Yue, Strengthening Foreign Trade Administration to Serve the Development of Our Foreign
Trade, in 1986 ZHONGGUO DUIWAIMAOYINIANJIAN, [1986 CHINA FOREIGN TRADE YEARBOOK] 492 (1987).
According to one estimate, between 1979 and 1986, China enacted over 300 economic laws and regulations,
half of which were related to foreign economic relations. Id.
94. Bing Wang, China's New Foreign Trade Lmv: Analysis and Implications for China's GATT Bid,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495, at 521. This article is a thorough and penetrating analysis of the 1994 Foreign
Trade Law, which I have relied heavily upon with respect to this legislation.
95. See PRC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 30, at 5, 54.
96. The Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 1, in HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 248.
97. Id at art. 2.
[Vol. 4:471
1997] GATT/WTO AND CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 495
principles of reciprocity and equity, grant other signatories or
participants the most favored nation status and national
treatment."
Based on these general principles, the FTL emphatically addresses the
issues of unified national trade policy, transparency, and conformity with
GATT principles and international practices with respect to NTBs, market
access, anti-dumping, subsidies, and safeguard measures.
China's foreign trade reform started with the decentralization of foreign
trade management. Prior to 1979, all major trade decisions were made by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) under the central government, and all
foreign trade transactions were carried out by a dozen Foreign Trade
Companies under MOFT's direct control.' Between 1979 and 1987, China
decentralized its foreign trade management by granting foreign trade rights to
other ministries of the central government besides MOFT,'" provinces and
municipalities, and a growing number of production enterprises.' By the
mid-1980s, several hundred foreign trade companies were established as
production enterprises under the auspices of various ministries of the central
government, provinces, and municipalities. In 1987, their number reached
1,500 and increased to 5,000 by 1990.2 As of 1994, China's foreign trade
was run by 9,000 foreign trade companies, manufacturing enterprises,
scientific research institutes, and industrial trade companies, as well as 190,000
foreign-funded enterprises engaged in foreign trade operation. 03 These newly
created NFTCs and other organizations with foreign trade authorization
acquired the right to handle all export commodities, except for sixteen kinds
of important export commodities which are still centralized under the National
Foreign Trade Company."
98. Id. at art. 6.
99. Wang, supra note 94, at 497.
100. In 1982, MOFT was combined with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Foreign
Investment Control Commission, and the Import-Export Commission into the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade (MOFERT). Eleven years later, MOFERT acquired the present name the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperations (MOFTEC).
101. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 34, at 37.
102. LARDY, supra note 17, at 39; WORLD BANK, CHINA: EXTERNAL TRADE AND CAprrAL 21(1988).
103. Xiao Wang, Trade Law Meets International Standards, Bus. WK. (CHINA DAILY SUPPLEMENT),
August 14, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS file.
104. Measures on the Control of Export Commodities, Art. 3 §2, Act of Dec. 30, 1992, 1 China Laws
for Foreign Bus. (CCH) P 50,708, at 66,663; LARDY, supra note 17, at 39.
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Decentralization injected energy and economic incentives into China's
foreign trade system. It served as the major driving force responsible for the
phenomenal growth of China's foreign trade in recent years. However, the
benefits of decentralization had not been achieved without accompanying
problems, of which the most prominent was the lack of unity and consistency
in trade policy implementation throughout the country and loss of supervisory
control by the central government. Local authorities and various ministries
under the central government often made regulations and rules that were
inconsistent with the national policies. They gave different, sometimes
conflicting, interpretations to the national laws and regulations. As a result,
national foreign trade policies and regulations were not uniformly enforced,
which not only caused confusion among China's trading partners but also
concern of the GATT contracting parties. 5
To remedy this problem of lack of unity, the FTL specifically affirms that
"The state shall implement a unified foreign trade system in order to safeguard
according to law a fair and free trade order."'" It vests "the department in
charge of foreign trade and economic cooperations under the State Council"
(presently MOFTEC) with the sole power to direct "foreign trade matters
throughout China in accordance with this Law."'" While the FTL brings back
unity into China's foreign trade management, it does not restore the highly
centralized structure which characterized the pre-reform foreign trade system.
Instead, it strikes a balance between unity of policy and decentralization of
operation in foreign trade by defining the role of MOFTEC as one of macro-
management in setting up broad policies, developing general goals, and
supervising the implementation of laws and regulations. Under the FTL, this
macro-management is to be exercised through the promulgation and
implementation of laws and regulations, and increasingly, through economic
means such as tariffs, interest rates, exchange rates, and loans."~
As a distinctive feature of a planned economy, lack of transparency was
preeminent in China's pre-reform foreign trade regime, which naturally
aroused concern by the GATT contracting parties over the incompatibility of
China's trade regime with the international practice of transparency in foreign
105. Wang, supra note 94, at 522.
106. The Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, art.4, in HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS supra note 61, at 248.
107. Id. at art. 3.
108. Wang, supra note 94, at 502.
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trade policies.'" In particular, the contracting parties voiced displeasure over
China's pervasive use of internal directives, commonly referred to as "internal
documents," which were available only to a very limited number of
government officials involved in foreign trade. Under this practice, "the
annual imports and exports plan was classified as top 'business secrets' of the
state.'" 0
Since the early 1980s, China has taken steps to improve the transparency
of its foreign trade regime. The promulgation of laws and regulations,
especially the FTL itself, has gradually yet decisively moved its foreign trade
regime away from total administrative control. In response to the GATT
contracting parties' requests to halt the use of "internal documents," China
published a significant number of previously unavailable decrees, rules, and
regulations. It also made further commitments not to enforce any law, rule,
regulation, administrative guidance, or policy measure governing trade unless
it was published."' The FTL's enactment represents a major step toward
greater transparency. It sets up a uniform legal framework for foreign trade
that can be followed by foreign trade partners. It clearly defines MOFTEC's
jurisdiction, authority, and relation to other governmental agencies involved
in foreign trade activities, and thus makes it much easier for foreign trade
partners to conduct their business within the jurisdiction of these agencies." 2
With respect to those major issues in international trade such as NTBs,
market access, government subsidies, anti-dumping, and safeguards, the FTL
closely follows the practices prescribed in the GATT charter and other
documents. Without entirely eliminating all kinds of NTBs in China's foreign
trade system, the FTL nevertheless has made the best effort possible under
current circumstances to reduce NTBs. The most striking progress occurred
with regard to the foreign trade planning practice. For more than thirty years,
foreign trade planning had been the most effective non-tariff device employed
by the central government to exert total control on foreign trade. It sets the
figures for the import and export of each product, the source of import and
export, and the allocation of foreign exchange. Once the plan is in place, the
State will allocate foreign exchange responsibilities to NFTCs to enable them
109. James McGregor, Chinese Talks on GATT Stall over Basic Issues, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
1993, at 1.
110. Wang, supra note 94, at 523.
111. Edward Balls, Survey of China, FIN. TIMES, November 18, 1993, at 7; China to Make Trade
Regulations Transparent, US. Official Says, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 20, 1992, at 3.
112. See Wang, supra note 94, at 524.
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to import the products covered under the import plan and to cover the losses
suffered by NFTCs in carrying out the export plan. The trade-restrictive effect
of foreign trade planning is that it prevents the market forces from playing a
role in directing imports and exports."3 During the 1980s, China gradually
reduced the role of foreign trade planning. In addition to the outright
abandonment of the mandatory export plan, the mandatory import plan, which
constituted 40 percent of China's imports in 1986, was reduced to cover only
18.5 percent of all imports in 1992.14 Reflecting its drafters' determination to
eventually abolish all mandatory foreign trade plans, the FTL is conspicuously
silent on foreign trade planning in its text-a clear indication that it perceives
no place for foreign trade planning within the new foreign trade regime."'
In dealing with another NTB, the licensing system, the FTL adopts a
pragmatic approach. On the one hand, the drafters of the FTL realize the
impossibility at this time of eradicating this practice. Thus, the FTL retains the
licensing system for the import and export of selected commodities and
technologies."" On the other hand, China treats licensing as a temporary
necessity to maintain continuity in its foreign trade practice, not as a central
piece of administrative control, and indicates its determination to eliminate
licensing in phases."7
Although the FTL falls shy of abolishing the use of quotas in foreign trade,
it requires the publication of the list of commodities under quotas and the
identification of the government department in charge of making the list,"s
thus introducing transparency and market mechanism into the administration
of quotas distribution. It is significant that, following the enactment of the
FTL, China published the rules for export quota bidding and conducted public
bidding for four agricultural products subject to export quotas." 9
In prescribing the measures dealing with trade surge, dumping, and
subsidies, the FTL directly borrows the solutions provided by GATT. Articles
29 (on safeguards), 30 (on dumping), and 31 (on subsidies) of the FTL parallel
113. WORLD BANK, supra note 41, at 24-26.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Wang, supra note 94, at 525.
116. The Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 19, in HANDBOOK OFLAWS AND
REGULATIONS, supra note 6 1, at 250-251.
117. Wang, supra note 94, at 525.
118. The Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 20, in HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 251.
119. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on Export Quota Bidding (MOFTEC,
Aug. 24, 1994), reprinted in CHINA EcoN. NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, at 5.
[Vol. 4:471
19971 GATT/WTO AND CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 499
the language used in Articles XIX (escape clause), VI (anti-dumping), and
XVI (subsidies) of GATT.2 This shows that the FTL resembles the GATT
charter almost verbatim and draws China's foreign trade legal regime even
closer to the international practice.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW
As demonstrated by its reform measures in tariff reduction, NTB
elimination, tax collection, foreign currency exchange management, and the
promulgation of the FTL, China has made serious efforts during the last
decade to move its foreign trade regime toward the international system
represented by GATT/WTO. The State's control of foreign trade has been
transformed from micro-control to macro-management. When the State
increasingly uses economic means to regulate foreign trade, the scope of
various NTBs has been significantly reduced. To be sure, there are still some
visible gaps between the current foreign trade regime under continuous reform
and the expectations of the GATT/WTO contracting parties. These gaps are
embodied in the retaining of a great deal of administrative control and in such
NTBs as commodities licensing and quotas.' While China acknowledges
these lingering inconsistencies in its foreign trade regime, it argues, quite
persuasively, that their continued existence is not the result of lack of sincerity
or effort on the Chinese part, but the product of the transitional nature of the
Chinese economic and legal system under current circumstances.'2 In
addition, China has made firm commitments to close these gaps within a
reasonable period of time. In March 1994, China submitted to the GATT a
proposal for tariff reduction, which committed it to maintain a ceiling of a
forty percent tariff rate on industrial products. This rate would be reduced
further to 35 percent by 1998 and to 30 percent within five years of China's
entry of GATT/WTO."' With regard to NTBs, China committed to the
gradual elimination of import quotas and licenses and to the reduction of
quantitative restrictions on imports from the current 1,247 tariff categories to
120. The Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 29-3 1, in HANDBOOK OF LAWS
AND REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at 252. For art. XIX, VI, and XVI of GATT, see GATT, supra note 19,
at 8-9, 19-20, 24-25.
121. Wang, supra note 94, at 531.
122. See generally id. at 523-524 (describing changes in China's Foreign Trade Practices).
123. Guiguo Wang, Economic Integration in Quest of Law-The Chinese Experience, 29 J. WORLD
TRADE 5 (1995), at 8-9 [hereinafter Economic Integration].
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240 by the year 2000.24 These objectives have been substantially achieved
through the reduction of average tariff rates to 23 percent on April 1, 1996.
Once these proposed changes take place, China's foreign trade regime will be
very much like most other market economy countries. Even at the present
stage, China's foreign trade regime under the 1994 FTL is more liberalized
than was the case with such centrally planned economies as Romania,
Hungary, and Poland when they were admitted into GATT during the 1960s
and 1970s." This fact enables China to substantiate its contention that,
contrary to their rhetoric, Western developed countries maintain a double
standard and obstruct China's accession to GATT/WTO not based on
economic reasons alone but on political considerations.' 6
It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the merit of the arguments in
this ongoing debate. In fact, no one now contends that China should be kept
outside WTO for too long, particularly in light of China's drastic tariff
reductions implemented in April 1996. The only question that remains is
timing. Moreover, no matter at what time China's accession to WTO
eventually materializes, the fundamental changes brought about by the
application process have had, and will continue to have, lasting impact not
only on China's foreign trade system but on the world economic order as well.
First, China's experience furnishes a good example of national legal
restructuring according to the norms of established international practice. In
an era of international economic integration, the molding impact of
international practices upon the legal restructuring of nation-states represents
the most important aspect of the process of globalization of law, which is far
more powerful and influential than the countervailing aspect of national
resistance to globalization. China's case provides strong empirical evidence
for the observation that the making of "domestic law" may "be affected
significantly by a variety of forces outside the control of any of the local"-and
national, I may add-"decision-makers involved."'' It also supports the
argument that "[g]lobal forces may encourage new forms of economic and
legal integration or harmonization across legal and economic systems."'"5
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. For a general discussion of the accession of other socialist countries to GATT, see K.
Grzybowski, Socialist Countries in GATT, 29 Am. J. COMPA L. 539, 547-49 (1980).
126. Economic Integration, supra note 123, at 24-25.
127. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1,1 (1993).
128. Id
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Without the influence of the GATT/WTO framework, it is impossible to
imagine that China's foreign trade regime could have achieved such a level of
liberalization towards free trade and market determination. This influence has
taken mainly two forms. The first form is achieved by passive response to
international norms, which is characterized by a certain degree of initial
unwillingness on the part of the nation-state. China's elimination of the dual-
rate foreign currency system in late 1993 offers a good illustration of this type
of passive acceptance. The second form is characterized by the nation-state's
active adoption of international norms. Most reform measures in its foreign
trade regime have been implemented by China on its own initiative. This fact
demonstrates China's willingness to use international norms as foundations of
national legal reform.
Facilitating national legal reform by the adoption of international practices
has special significance to the success of legal restructuring in a country like
China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist eastern bloc,
China became one of a few former communist/socialist countries which still
adheres to socialism in the present world. As long as the Communist Party is
still in power, it is unforeseeable that China will completely abandon its
adherence to socialism. This adherence in turn has prevented, and will
continue to prevent, the Chinese leaders from openly adopting the economic,
political, and legal systems of the Western capitalist countries, especially when
one particular system is so closely associated with the practice of one country
that it carries the name of that country. Handy examples are the American
constitutional principles of federalism, separation of powers, and the two-party
system."9 This conviction, of course, has created seemingly irreconcilable
129. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has repeatedly declared that it will never adopt in entirety
the Western-style market system, the American-style federalism, separation of powers and the two-party
system, or the Western value of human rights. It is worthwhile to note that during the entire period of
economic reform and trade liberalization, the CCP has continued its political campaign against the so-called
"Total Westernization" and demonstrated intolerance of pro-democracy activists. In a recent speech
published in the Party's official newspaper, Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of CCP and President of China,
reiterated this official line against the Western-style political system. He wrote:
Our socialist democratic system represents the democracy for the people on the
widest basis and is most suitable to our country's conditions. It is therefore the best
democratic system. Some people in the United States and other Western countries
have always wanted to spread their type of parliamentary democracy to the whole
world and make it the generally adopted model. This is only a fantasy. In the West,
there are such systems as an upper house and a lower house [in the legislature]. But
the highest power institution of ours is only one, that is the National People's
Congress .... We are fully justified to proclaim that our system of the National
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tension between "economic marketization" and political and ideological
adherence to socialism. 3 Without being able to follow, at least openly, the
practices of Western countries,- the reform-minded Chinese leaders turn to
international organizations for guiding principles and practices in their effort
to introduce market reform to the Chinese economy. This approach has the
benefit of avoiding inconsistency or conflict with the official ideology. Thus,
international norms in trade and economic cooperation have received wide
attention in China and are enthusiastically advocated as models worth
emulating by government officials and scholars.' This advocacy has created
an exceptionally benign environment for the acceptance of GATT principles
and practices in China.
Second, the molding power of GATT/WTO is by no means limited only
to the Chinese foreign trade legal regime. It has also reached other parts of
China's foreign economic legal regime, and indeed, the entire economic legal
system. Viewed in the larger context of China's economic reform, the
implementation of major legislation regulating foreign investment and
economic exchange in the late 1970s and early 1980s' spearheaded the
People's Congress is both much more democratic than and superior to the system of
'separation of powers' adopted in the Western countries.
Jiang Zemin, Tantan Jiang Zhengzhi [On the Importance of Political Ideaology, RENMIN RIBAO [THE
PEOPLE'S DAILY] (Overseas Edition), Mar. 3, 1996, at i.
130. FENG CHEN, ECONOMIC TRANSMON AND POLmcAL LEGITIMACY IN POST-MAO CHINA:
IDEOLOGY AND REFORM 4(1995).
131. In resolving conflict of laws problems in international transactions, China has upheld the
applicability of both international treaties and international custom. For instance, Article 142 of the General
Principles of the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China, April 12, 1986, declares the following:
To the extent that an international treaty in which the People's Republic of China is
a contracting party or participant conflicts with the civil law of the People's Republic
of China, the international treaty shall apply, except for those clauses the People's
Republic of China has made express reservations.
To the extent that the law of the People's Republic of China and the international
treaties in which the People's Republic of China is a contracting party or participant
are devoid of regulation, international custom may apply.
P.R.C. LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 30, at 599. See also Henry R. Zheng, Private International Law in
the People's Republic of China: Principles and Procedures, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 231 (1987) (with particular
reference to 235-37).
132. This legislation includes mainly the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint-Ventures (July 1979), in PRC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 30, at 1152-5; the Foreign
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (March 1985), id at 1234-135; the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises (April 1986), id. at 144445; the Law
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establishment of a new economic legal system. Indeed, "[o]f all the legal
institutions that have appeared since the reforms began in the 1980s, those
concerned with foreign investment have developed the fastest."'3 Many
practices were first introduced in foreign-related economic activities and then
applied to domestic enterprises and economic activities as well. For instance,
the unification of tax rates levied on enterprise was first introduced in 1991 for
enterprises with foreign concerns only. By the end of 1993, however, similar
measures were taken to unify the tax law relating to domestic enterprises. In
fact, many reform-minded leaders within the Chinese Communist Party have
long realized the far-reaching impact of international norms on China's
economic and legal restructuring as a whole. They have intentionally utilized
the process of China's application to GATT/WTO as a vehicle to promote
system-wide reform. As acutely pointed out by Donald C. Clarke, the
reformers' "principal concern is not trade at all; it is to use the GATT as
stalking horse to dismantle the institutions that they feel stand in the way of
domestic reform."'3 For example, an article published in a widely circulated
business newspaper in China notes that once China joins the GATT,
the market mechanism will touch the deep-level defects of the
planned economy that have never been touched upon by
reforms in our country .... The GATT's impact on the
current structure will not be limited only to stimulating
enterprises to acquire dynamism. The high efficiency will be
accompanied by the disappearance of the planning and
approval-giving [administrative] organs, the closure of
enterprises failing to adapt themselves to the new
environment, and the equal opportunities of selecting jobs and
being selected for workers. "
Third, to adopt GATT/WTO practice at the beginning stage of its
economic legal restructuring has enabled China to establish a legal system
based on the commonly accepted international norms in the present world.
of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (April 1988), id. at 1561-
62.
133. Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, THE CHINA QUARTERLY 1, 7 (1995).
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That practice will have lasting positive impact on China's economic
development in the next century. When China first implemented its policy of
openness to the outside world in the late 1970s, there was hardly a legal system
to speak of with respect to economic exchanges because administrative control
had been imposed for the previous thirty years. Fortunately, the void of legal
framework in the economic system has made it easier for China to adopt the
most up-to-date international practices without much constraint from
traditional legal structure or customs. As a result, the contemporary Chinese
framework of economic law, though far from being complete or satisfactory,
in most part contains the best regarded principles and practices in the Western
world. In addition, the FTL was drafted by closely following the principles
and practices of GATT. The law governing foreign-related economic contracts
contains strong influence from the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods. The reformed tax system evinces many important
attributes of the tax laws of the Western countries, especially the United States.
The laws on protecting intellectual and industrial properties closely resemble
those of the European countries, especially the German system. The
Corporation Law, promulgated in December 1993, adopts a combination of the
Anglo-American and European Continental systems. 36  By adopting
internationally recognized principles and practices to construct its economic
law, China has successfully established a rudimentary legal framework which
is capable of allowing China to play a meaningful role in an age of
international economic integration. With this development in mind, it is hard
to agree with the observation that China presents a major "exception" to the
world trend of globalization of law. In light of the progress China has made
so far in its legal reform, it is quite likely that China will be able to "enter
global markets" without "shielding most of its population from the
globalization of law." 3"
In the final analysis, one cannot accurately assess the implications of
China's use of GATT/WTO principles and practices to reform its legal system
without realizing that the international norms represented by GATTIWTO are
136. Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the Peoples
Republic Of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273 (1995); Preston M. Torbert, Contract Law in the People's
Republic of China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
321, 325-26 (Michael J. Moser, ed., 2nd ed. 1987). See also Jia Zhao, Implementing Regulations for
Copyright Law, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1991, at 10, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
EASIAN File. See generally Economic Integration, supra note 123, at 16, 18.
137. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Lmv, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 57 (1993).
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also experiencing significant changes themselves. By any standard, the WTO
is far from being identical with the GATT at the time of its inception in 1947
or even at the time of China's initial application in 1986. In view of the
profound changes in the world economic structure, many proposals have been
put forward to make corresponding revisions in GATT/WTO." The changing
attitude of the United States toward GATTWTO is clearly indicative of this
change of tide. As the principal driving force behind the formation of GATT
in the aftermath of World War II, the United States continued to be the leading
proponent of the GATT principle of free trade throughout much of the first
thirty years of GATT's existence. From the mid-1980s on, however, the
United States, under the unprecedented pressure of a growing trade deficit,
began to reevaluate the usefulness of unilateralism and even protectionist
measures in international trade, which led it to question the merit of many
GATT principles. 39 It was at this juncture that China started to reform its
economic and legal systems according to such established international norms
as GATT/WTO principles. As observed by Jack N. Behrman, "China today
faces a world economy already shaped by prior players; and the United States
faces a world that is significantly altering the rules it had promulgated."'" To
a considerable extent, China and the United States are representatives of two
basic forces in contemporary world economic order. Although it is still too
early to predict with precision the outcome of role-shifting and adaptation on
both sides, it is almost certain that the convergence of these two countervailing
forces will in large part determine the direction of not only further
international economic integration, but also increasing globalization of law in
the century to come.
V. CONCLUSION
In many respects, China's experience in reforming its foreign trade legal
regime in accordance with the normative GATT/WTO principles demonstrates
the dynamics of interaction between international norms and national legal
restructuring in the age of the globalization of law. In particular, it affords a
138. See generally JACKSON, supra note 15, at 91-103.
139. See generally id. at 110.
140. Jack N. Behrman, China in the World Economy: The Changing Global Context for Trade, in
EXPANDING SINO-AMERICAN BUSINESS AND TRADE: CHINA'S ECONOMic TRANSITION 242 (Dennis A.
Rondinelli, ed.,1994).
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unique opportunity to illustrate the role played by and the impact upon the
nation-state in the process of globalization.
From its emergence in the mid-seventeenth century until the mid-twentieth
century, the nation-state was always regarded as the dominant actor in
international economic relationships; the world economy was accordingly
conceptualized as a set of interlocking national economies. 4' Since the Second
World War, the globalization of markets, especially the rise of the
transnational corporations as a rival to the nation-state in economic activities,
has altered the traditional role of the nation-state in the world economy to such
an extent that, according to one viewpoint, it "makes most nation states [sic]
relatively insignificant elements within the operation of the world economy.' ' 42
However, this change does not mean that the nation-state has ceased to be an
important factor in the increasingly globalized world economy. On the
contrary, as asserted by Peter Dicken, "the political institution of the nation
state [sic] remains a most significant force in shaping the world economy."'4 3
While both views can find support in empirical evidence, they in fact
emphasize different aspects of the same process. On the one hand, the
increasing globalization of markets has the effect of diminishing national
boundaries in economic exchange and thereby reducing the importance of the
nation-state in its traditional role as the basic economic unit in the world
economy. On the other hand, this globalization of markets compels each
country to restructure its legal framework in order to enhance the
competitiveness of its national economy in the global market. The nation-state
assumes the task of directing the process of national legal restructuring. In
executing this historical task, the nation-state, as demonstrated by the
experience of China, realizes that the best way to strengthen its national
economy is to adopt the established international principles and practices.
Thus, by utilizing international norms to formulate its national policies and
legal regime, the nation-state has effectively championed the globalization of
law, which in turn furthers the globalization of markets and economic
activities. In this sense, the nation-state, despite the fact that it is in many
ways an antithesis to the trend toward globalization and its traditional
prominence in economic life is under serious challenge from such new forces
141. See S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its Impact on Domestic Institutions, I IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 83, 83 (1993). See generally LESLIE SKLAIR, SOCIOLOGY OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM:
SOCIAL CHANGE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (1991).
142. R.J. JOHNSTON, GEOGRAPHY AND THE STATE 61 (1982).
143. DiCKEN, supra note I, at 148.
[Vol. 4:471
1997] GATT/WTO AND CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 507
as transnational corporations, still plays a uniquely important role in the
promotion of further globalization.

